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This Article analyzes the basisfor safe-haven programsfor refugees fleeing war and civil strife under contemporaryprinciples of
international law. The authors trace the development of safe-haven programs in the United States and offer an analysis and critique of the Temporary Protected Status program created by the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990. Focusing on the struggle to gain safe haven for refugees from El Salvador, the authors
review the United States government's historical use of safe haven
programs as a political tool. Finally, the Article looks at how
other countries have responded to refugee crises and suggests a
policy for the United States that is consistent with international
refugee law.
INTRODUCTION

Between January 1,-1991 and June 30, 1992, approximately two

hundred thousand Salvadorans living in the United States registered
for Temporary Protected Status (TPS). 1 Legislation creating TPS
was enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 19902 and provides
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Amy Beer is the Legal Director of the Guatemala Program of the Humanitarian Law
Project. Tim Everett is Directing Attorney of the Domestic Legal Department at El
Rescate. Evangeline Nichols Ordaz is a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Foundation of
Los Angeles.
I. IMMIGRATION LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE 53 (Jan. 29, 1992) (report prepared
for presentation to the United States Commission on Civil Rights by the law firm of
Arnold & Porter and the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 303, 104 Stat. 4978.

temporary safe haven to individuals in the United States who are
refugees from conditions of general civil strife or natural disaster in
their home countries.
The legislation granting TPS to Salvadorans expired on June 30,
1992. Despite a vigorous campaign to convince the United States
government to redesignate El Salvador as a country whose nationals
are eligible for TPS, on May 4, 1992, President Bush declined to do
so, instead ordering a different program of Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for all Salvadoran nationals registered for TPS.
Refugee experts and human rights activists had hoped that the
enactment of TPS legislation signaled a change in United States policy toward grounding that policy in norms of contemporary international law and concepts of due process. The Bush administration's
refusal to designate El Salvador under the general TPS statute, and
its revival of an obsolete executive program of DED, is a disturbing
indication that United States refugee policy is regressing from its
original basis in international law.
This Article puts the passage of TPS legislation and the grant of
TPS to Salvadorans into a historical and contextual framework and
offers a criticism of the decision of the United States to turn back
the clock on contemporary norms of international law and practice.
I.

BACKGROUND

Over the last decade, few "legal" issues have been as thoroughly
debated among policymakers, activists, and the general public as the
proper legal status of the Central American refugee. Debate about
the obligation of the United States to provide safe haven for refugees
from Central American civil wars erupted shortly after the first major influx of Salvadoran refugees in 1979. Salvadoran refugees soon
had company for their trek northward. Regional instability throughout Central America created a refugee crisis that eventually resulted
in the migration of3 hundreds of thousands of Central Americans to
the United States.
In the early 1980s, as refugee flow across the southern border of
the United States increased,4 the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), which has the dual function of immigration control
3. The ongoing civil war in Guatemala intensified greatly in the early 1980s, sending thousands fleeing, as did the Sandinista revolution and prolonged counterrevolutionary attacks in Nicaragua. For a history of the factors underlying this forced migration of
Central Americans, see Angela D. Sante, Central American Refugees: A Consequence of
War and Social Upheaval, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S

RESPONSES 89 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989).
4. During the 1980s, Central American refugees had practically no opportunity to
apply for refugee status through the overseas refugee program, which is based entirely on
presidential discretion. DENNIS GALLAGHER ET AL.. OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN: U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
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and refugee adjudication, reacted with little hospitality. The INS
treated Central American refugees, for the most part, as similarly

situated to Mexican immigrants. The refugees were labeled "illegal
economic migrants," and the majority were shipped back to their

home countries without being apprised of their right to a deportation
hearing or their right to apply for political asylum. 5

II.

CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF "REFUGEE"

The Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act) 6 created a system
through which refugees could apply for asylum or protection both

from within the United States and from abroad. The Refugee Act,
which conforms to the United Nations Convention Relating to the

Status of Refugees (Convention), 7 defines a refugee as:
Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality.., and
who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion.8

Scholars have thoughtfully and forcefully argued that this narrow
definition of refugee is broadening to reflect contemporary realities,
(1985). Thus, because neither a viable overseas refugee program nor a safe haven program existed, political asylum remained the only available protected status, and application for asylum in effect required the refugee to be physically present in the United
States. David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MIcH.
Y.B..INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91. Once in the United States, an asylum seeker may apply
affirmatively to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for asylum or, if
placed in a deportation proceeding, may raise eligibility for asylum as a defense. Over
the last decade, the majority of Salvadoran and'Guatemalan refugees applied for political asylum as a defense to deportation.
5. Many lawsuits eventually brought raised issues of U.S. refugee law and policy,
but few specifically raised the issue of safe haven. One of the most important cases,
however, forced the INS to desist from its practice of removing Salvadoran nationals
without allowing them a hearing. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376-78
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
6. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For a concise discussion of prior law, see DEBORAH E. ANKER. THE
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1991).
7. Opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S: No. 6577, at 606,
189 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Convention]. While the United States did not originally
sign and ratify the Convention, the United States did sign and ratify the Protocol on the
Convention, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, thereby binding it to the provisions of the Convention. The Protocol simply removed the geographic and time limitations that existed in the Convention.
8. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980 (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).

and that temporary safe haven for refugees who do not fit the Convention's narrow definition ("non-Convention" refugees) is becoming
a customary norm of international law. 9 While some have grounded
this norm in humanitarian law' ° and others in human rights law, 1'
its development can most clearly be seen in the changing practices of
individual countries, by their collective action through the United
Nations,' 2 and by the adoption of regional instruments.'
The Convention 4 was drafted to address the specific problem of
Eastern Europeans fleeing their homelands because of political persecution.1 5 Since the drafting of the Convention in 1951, patterns of
worldwide refugee flow have changed dramatically, but the scope of
the Convention itself remains limited to those who fear persecution if
returned to their country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion.' 6
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 7 the bulk of refugees today are fleeing war, civil
unrest, and famine.' 8 The Convention does not make allowance for,
these refugees within its scope.' 9 The UNHCR increasingly has been
involved with such refugees, and this role has been unanimously supported by the members of the world community.20
Efforts to modify the Convention to encompass this larger definition of refugee have thus far been unsuccessful. 2 ' International
9.

Joan F. Hartman & Deborah Perluss, Non-Refoulement and Humanitarian

Refugees: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857 (1986).
10. Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees Under International Humanitarian
Law, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 33 (Ved P.
Nanda ed., 1989).
11. Todd Howland, A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Definition of a Refugee, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 33 (1987).
12. Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1991).
13. See, e.g., Paul Weis, The Convention of the Organization of African Unity
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 3 Hum, RTS. J 449
(1970).
14. Convention, supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 291.

16.

In 1967 the geographical limitation present in the 1951 Convention was re-

moved. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223. See supra note 7.

17.

The United Nations approved the Statute of the Office of the High Commis-

sioner for Refugees with G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46,
U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
18. See, e.g., Report of the Economic and Social Council: Situation of Human

Rights in El Salvador, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/
39/636 (1984).
19. Gunning, supra note 12, at 240.
20. For an interesting and detailed discussion of these developments, see Gunning,
supra note 12, at 240-46.
21. See, e.g., the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N.

GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) in 62 Am. J. INT'L L.
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treaty law has lagged behind changes in regional instruments and in
individual state laws and practices that more appropriately define
the term "refugee" to include all forced migrants.
Among regional instruments, the Organization of African Unity's

Convention Governing the Special Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa (OAU Convention) is the most comprehensive. The OAU
Convention defines a refugee as follows:
[E]very person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place
of habitual residence in order to22 seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality.

This approach was followed in the Cartagena Declaration, under

which a refugee was defined broadly to include those who flee their
country because of "generalized violence," "international conflicts,"

or "serious disturbances of public peace. "23 Many states, for example, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Sweden, have incorporated

broader definition of a refugee into their domestic statutes.24

this

The United States has publicly indicated its subscription to the

idea that safe haven for non-Convention refugees is an international
obligation. For example, in 1979, when Thailand accepted neighboring Cambodians fleeing civil strife as refugees, the United States
Secretary of State described the action as "correct," and members of
Congress described the Thai government's response as "fulfill[ing]
internationally recognized standards for assisting and protecting Indochinese refugees. '"25
Despite its public position on the international refugee crisis, in its
domestic practice, the United States has been slow to safeguard protections for non-Convention refugees. TPS for Salvadorans was the

product of the collective effort of activists and advocates, who spent
822 (1968) and the, ill-fated Elaborationof a Draft Convention on TerritorialAsylum,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 81, U.N. Doc. A/10177 (1975).
22. Organization of African Unity: Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, 8
I.L.M. 1288, 1290 (1969).
23. Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 592-93 (1986) (quoting the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984 (on file with the San Diego Law Review)).
24. See Gunning, supra note 12, at 242-43.
25. Isabelle R. Gunning, Expanding the International Definition of Refugee: A
Multicultural View, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 35, 53 (1989) (citing 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 10
(Dec. 1979); STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY OF
THE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY. 97TH CONG..
EAST ASIA: 1981, at 20 (Comm. Print 1982)).

2D SESS..

REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH-

hundreds of thousands of hours over the last decade working to obtain safe haven for Salvadoran refugees. In order to understand the
achievement TPS represents, it is instructive to examine other attempts by advocates to bring United States treatment of refugees
into line with international legal norms. Four principal avenues have
been used: the courts, the sanctuary movement, the administration,
and Congress.2
A. The Courts
Traditional litigation strategies were employed, with varying degrees of success, to obtain safe haven for Salvadorans both in the
representation of individuals, usually as a claim for political asylum
in the- context of a deportation hearing, and in class action litigation.
1. Individual Advocacy
The first major test of the Refugee Act came in the early 1980s
with the arrival of thousands of Central Americans. For those seeking safe haven in the United States, the Refugee Act created only
one option: political asylum. Immigration judges narrowly construed
the 1980 Act and the 1951 definition upon which it was based, and
this resulted in a dismally low success rate for Salvadoran asylum
seekers, averaging about one to three percent of total cases.
Accordingly, advocates constantly searched for new theories to
gain safe haven for clients who had fled civil war. One of the most
popular strategies was a motion for nonrefoulement ("no return").
Motions were most frequently based on the Geneva Conventions of
194928

and customary

international

law.2 9 The

majority

of

26. Legislative, legal, and community-sanctuary efforts to obtain or provide safe
haven for Salvadoran nationals were usually linked with efforts to obtain or provide that
status for Guatemalans as well. See, e.g., Michele Altemus, The Sanctuary Movement, 9
WHITTIER L. REv. 683 (1988).
Nicaraguans usually were not included in this effort because the reception they received in the United States was very different from that received by the Salvadorans and
Guatemalans. The Nicaraguans enjoyed a favorable treatment from the INS. Often Nicaraguans' political asylum approval rating averaged significantly higher than that of
Salvadorans and Guatemalans. See, e.g., Peter Koehn, Persistent Problems and Political
Issues in U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 67 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989) [hereinafter Koehn, Persistant Problems and Political Issues]. See generally PETER KOEHN. REFUGEES FROM
REVOLUTION: U.S. POLICY AND THIRD-WORLD MIGRATION (1991).

27. E.g., Koehn, Persistent Problems and Political Issues, supra note 26.
28. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (4th Geneva
Convention) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
29. These theories have generated extensive law review commentary. See, e.g.,
Karen Parker, The Rights of Refugees Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 33 (Ved P. Nanda ed.,
1989); Perluss & Hartman, supra note 23.
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nonrefoulement motions were simply denied by immigration judges
and went no further. However, a few cases did wend their way
through the justice system.30
In 1985, an immigration judge in Harlingen, Texas held that
Jesus Medina, a Salvadoran, had a private right to relief from deportation in the form of nonrefoulement based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949.31 Unfortunately, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) overturned the immigration judge's decision and thus seriously set back the attempt to gain safe haven status for Salvadoran
refugees through individual deportation hearings.3 2 The BIA held
that neither the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War nor customary international law creates a potential remedy from deportation other than that provided by
the Immigration and Nationality Act. This meant that, according to
the BIA, the only form of relief available to individuals seeking safe
haven was to show eligibility for political asylum by meeting the definition of "refugee" provided by the Refugee Act and the
Convention.3 3
The first nonrefoulement case to reach a federal appellate court
was that of Blanca Rosa Echeverria Hernandez, a Salvadoran who
fled her native land because of the civil war. In a significant blow to
the theory and application of nonrefoulement in the United States,
on January 14, 1991, a panel of the Ninth Circuit ruled against Ms.
Echeverria Hernandez. In a wide-ranging decision that took a restrictive view of international law, three themes can be extracted.
First, the Ninth Circuit took the position that the Refugee Act preempted the application of international law to deportation cases; second, it concluded that the Geneva Convention applied only to
international armed conflicts, and thus was not applicable to the Salvadoran situation; and third, the court found that customary international law is merely one of a number of sources of legal standards to
be consulted in the absence of any other kind of legal authority.34
30. Interview with Edward J. Flynn, Legal Director of Central American Refugee
Center (CARECEN), Los Angeles, California (Nov. 15, 1991).
31. In re Jesus del Carmen Medina in Deportation Proceedings, No. A26-949-415
(July 25, 1985). While legally this ruling was a major victory, the respondent (the person
under deportation proceedings) was denied relief from deportation because he had not
factually met his burden of proof that the Geneva Conventions actually applied to the
situation in El Salvador.
32. In re Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA Oct. 7, 1988).
33. Id.
34. Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra note 35 and accompanying text.

The Court of Appeals decision did not fully consider the difficult and
complex issue of when a principle of international law reaches the
status of a binding custom. In fact, the court ignored expert opinion,
as well as official statements and actions, that indicated a customary
principle had evolved, or at least was in the process of evolving, concerning safe haven for refugees who do not meet the Convention definition. The decision created an impediment for the development of
nonrefoulement as a legal principle.
On November 5, 1991, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed
the earlier panel's decision as being gratuitous, given the previous
passage of TPS for Salvadoran nationals. 5 In so holding, the court
left open the question of whether the principle of nonrefoulement
had achieved the level of custom, and so allowed the law to develop
unhindered by the panel's decision.
In only one case has an advocate been able to use international
law to gain safe haven for an individual fleeing a country in the
midst of a civil war. On August 24, 1990, a District of Columbia
immigration judge, basing his decision on the doctrine of necessity
(which, for example, allows a ship to seek a port in a storm without
being considered a trespasser or in violation of immigration laws),
ruled that the principle of nonreturn to a country in the midst of
civil war constituted a customary international legal principle that
must be applied in deportation proceedings. This decision was, however, based on the premise that international law prohibits deportation, as opposed to requiring safe haven. 3 While the INS appealed
the decision, the case was administratively closed as a result of the
passage of TPS and was never ruled upon by the BIA.
2. Class Actions
In addition to individual advocacy, two class action suits have
been brought to attempt to achieve safe haven for Central American
Refugees. In Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v.
Smith,38 a group of Salvadorans challenged the Attorney General's
failure to grant Extended Voluntary Departure status (EVD) 39 to
35. Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 946 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991).
36. In re Maria Elana Santos, No. A29-564-781 (Immigr. Judge, Washington,
D.C., Aug. 24, 1990). The immigration judge distinguished his holding from that of the
BIA's decision in Medina by finding that a person fleeing has no right to choose the
country of refuge and that these persons can be deported to a third safe country; they
simply cannot be returned to their home country.
37. Interview with William Van Wyke, attorney for Ms. Santos, Washington, D.C.
(Dec. 4, 1991).
38. 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984), aJfd in part and rev'd in part, 804 F.2d 1256
(D.C. Cir. 1986), aif'd, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
39. Extended Voluntary Departure Status (EVD) was a blanket temporary suspension of the deportation process and the precursor to Temporary Protected Status (TPS).
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Salvadorans. Prior to this suit, the Attorney General, acting without
a statute, had granted EVD on fifteen occasions to nationals from
countries experiencing civil war or civil unrest.4 0
The class action was unsuccessful. The court expressly declined to
"impose a humanitarian standard on the Attorney General's exercise
of discretion," adding that it did not want to "open up irresponsibly
the floodgates to illegal aliens.'
In American Baptist Churches v. Meese,42 individuals, church
groups, and refugee organizations joined together in asserting that:
(i) the United States was violating international law by deporting
Salvadorans and Guatemalans to countries in the midst of civil war,
(ii) sanctuary activities are protected under the First Amendment,
(iii) EVD was being applied in a discriminatory fashion; and (iv) the
1980 Refugee Act was being applied in a discriminatory fashion to
Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers.
The first two claims were rejected, 43 but in a historic settlement,
the INS conceded its discriminatory application of the asylum provisions of the Refugee Act.4 4 Although the American Baptist
Churches settlement fundamentally changed the asylum review process, it also served to reinforce the idea that refugees who do not
meet the narrow definition found in the Convention and the 1980
Refugee Act presently have no recourse within the United States
system.
B.

The Sanctuary Movement

While efforts to obtain safe haven for Central Americans did not
find success in the courts, communities of faith sought to protect individual refugees from INS detection and deportation by founding
A discussion of EVD follows in notes 52-64 infra and accompanying text.
40. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND
POLICY 728 (1985).
41. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 594 F. Supp. at 508.
42. American Baptist Churches v. Meese, C-85-3255 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6,
1988).
43. American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
44. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal.
1991). The settlement involved in this case has had a tremendous impact on Salvadoran
and Guatemalan asylum adjudications in this country, as it requires the INS to readjudicate the asylum claims of each member of a class estimated to number as many as
500,000. Debbie Smith, Unprecedented Victory for Guatemalanand SalvadoranAsylum
Applicants: American Baptist Churches Settlement Agreement, 14 IMMIGR. J. 27, 27-29
(1991).

the sanctuary movement,
one of the most controversial social move45
ments of the 1980s.
Essentially, the sanctuary movement was based on a difference of
interpretation of United States international legal obligations. The
government took the position that it had no legal obligation to Central American refugees other than the narrow protections of the Refugee Act. Sanctuary activists, however, saw the international
legal
46
principle of safe haven as supporting their actions.
The sanctuary movement reached its peak in the fall of 1986. At
that point more than three hundred churches and synagogues had
declared themselves places of sanctuary, 47 as well as twenty-two cities and two states that had declared themselves to be places of refuge for Central Americans.48 While the sanctuary movement cited a
traditional religious basis for its actions, the movement also frequently relied on international law, arguing that the United States
was violating its international obligation by forcibly repatriating refugees to war-torn countries.49
The response of the Justice Department was to prosecute sanctuary activists. International law and the principle of safe haven were
unsuccessfully used as a defense in the various sanctuary trials, and
a number of activists were eventually convicted of violating United
States immigration laws.50 In many ways the convictions, and the
failure of the international legal defense, had a profound psychological impact on the movement and can be considered a turning point.
After that point the nature of the sanctuary movement changed, and
while increasingly dispersed, many former members of the movement began to focus their collective energies on change within the
system.51

45. ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY:
LAW IN COLLISION (1988).

A

STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE

46. See generally Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old
Right or a DangerousMisinterpretationof an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN.
L. REv. 747 (1986); Elizabeth Hull, The Sanctuary Movement: The Fight of the Cross
and the Flag, MIGRATION TODAY, Vol. 13, No. 5, 1985, at 6-16.
47. BASTA (Feb. 1986) (BASTA was a newsletter of the Sanctuary movement).
48. For a more detailed explanation, see Todd Howland & Richard Garcia, The
Refugee Crisis and the Law: The "City Sanctuary" Response, in REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 185 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989).
49. For an overview of the movement and a thorough account of the religious tradition of sanctuary, see IGNATIUS BAU. THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY
AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES (1985).
50. See. e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 751 (1991).
51. From that point on, few new churches declared themselves places of sanctuary
and some of ther city sanctuary declarations were repealed. Interview with Richard Garcia, Director of Centro de Asuntos Migratorios, San Diego, California (Apr. I, 1992).
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C.

The Executive Branch

From the time the first Salvadoran arrived to seek refuge from

civil war, the United States administration had the means available
to provide safe haven. While EVD has no specific statutory basis,
various administrations have, since 1960, used their discretion to ap-

ply immigration laws to provide EVD to nationals of fifteen countries because of civil unrest in their homelands. 52 Until recently,
EVD has been the only humanitarian relief available to "non-Con-

vention" or war refugees who find themselves in the United States.5"

According to former Acting INS Commissioner Doris Meissner,
the decision whether to grant EVD is based on two factors: the con-

ditions in the country under consideration and United States inter-

ests in a particular case.54 The State Department usually initiates a

grant of EVD by sending a letter to the Attorney General describing
"conditions in the country under consideration and explain[ing] why
return by its nationals from the United States in the normal course
should be suspended." 55

52. EVD has been used to provide safe haven to refugees from countries including
Ethiopia, Uganda, Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. See THOMAS A.
ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 840-53 (2d ed.
1991).
53. Id. Prior to the use of Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Salvadorans,
discussed infra at Section IV, the administration had used one other program to protect
an entire class of refugees, the DED program for certain Chinese nationals following the
massacre at Tiananmen Square in May 1989. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying
text.
54. H.R. REP. No. 627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988).
55. Letters from Secretary of State George Schultz and Attorney General William
French Smith support the idea that the criteria for EVD included more than just a consideration of country conditions. The State Department "invariably considers a number
of other factors in deciding whether to recommend the granting of EVD in any particular
case, and the granting of EVD will meet different objectives in different cases." Letter
from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to William French Smith, Attorney General
(June 23, 1983), reprinted in Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Jt. App. tab 17, at 1, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 822203) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum]. The Attorney General went so far as to
say that there are no specific criteria. Letter from William French Smith, Attorney General, to members of Congress who wrote the Attorney General and Secretary of State
asking for EVD for Salvadorans (July 19, 1983), reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra, Jt. App. tab 18, at I. The existence of violence or political instability is not
necessarily sufficient grounds for instituting EVD. The Attorney General listed a number
of other considerations that might affect the decision. These include the existence of a
third country of safe haven and the adequacy of other immigration remedies.

It is noteworthy that the comments that accompany INS direc-

tives granting EVD usually cite only humanitarian concerns regarding conditions in the country under consideration, while selection of
nationalities has been related to political factors."" Advocates and
commentators have argued that, through thirty years of EVD, the

Attorney General has established a de facto standard based on humanitarian concern for those fleeing unstable conditions in their
country of nationality, and for that reason Salvadorans were entitled
to EVD. 57 In this context, petitioners have argued bias in the application of EVD to refugees fleeing only from communist countries."8
Because of the lack of a statutory basis for EVD, however, the Attorney General has enjoyed total discretion in determining which
country's nationals should benefit from it.' 9
Given that the political conditions in El Salvador were comparable
to, or even more severe than, those in countries whose nationals were
the beneficiaries of EVD, and that the unavailability of other immigration remedies supported a grant of EVD to Salvadorans, frustration with the Department of State and the Attorney General's

unwillingness to extend EVD to nationals of El Salvador grew.60 As
it did so, Congress began to lobby for Salvadoran EVD. In 1981,
Senator Edward Kennedy requested that EVD be granted to
Salvadorans."' A negative response from the State Department led

Congress to pass a nonbinding "Sense of Congress" resolution that
56. Linda J. Oswald, Note, Extending Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General's Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REv. 152, 177 (1986). In
a press release, the State Department cited the institution of martial law as the impetus
for granting EVD to Polish nationals, starting in 1981. I.N.S. Wire of Jan. 21, 1982,

reprinted in 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 85 (1982). See also Department of Justice Press
Release, June 18, 1987, reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 771 (1987). Other
grants of EVD have been based on: the continuing "civil strife" in Lebanon (INS Wire

of Dec. 12, 1978, reprinted in 55

INTERPRETER RELEASES

of July 12, 1982, reprinted in 59

INTERPRETER RELEASES

85 (1978)); the "turmoil pre-

vailing in" Afghanistan (INS Wire of Dec. 2, 1980, reprinted in 62 INTERPRETFR RELEASES 106 (1985)); and the "circumstances currently prevailing" in Ethiopia (INS Wire

456 (1982)).

57. Oswald, supra note 56, at 177.
58. See, e.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F.
Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984), affid in part and rev'd in part, 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir.
1986), af/'d, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (class action challenge to denial of EVD
for Salvadoran nationals).
59. Oswald, supra note 56, at 177-79.
60. For example, even the Salvadoran President, Jose Napoleon Duarte, lobbied
for the extension of EVD to Salvadoran nationals. He warned of possible economic crisis
in El Salvador if large numbers of refugees were returned. He also stated his fear that
the civil war would be prolonged in that, in his opinion, many of the refugees had sympathy for the guerrillas and would become involved in the civil war on the side of the
guerrillas if returned. Nancy J. Mims, Note, Granting Safe Haven to El Salvadoran
Refugees: Moakley-De Concini Bill Offers Humanitarian Approach to Difficult
Problems in the United States and Central America, 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L J. 603,
613-14, 614 n.56 (1989).
61. Oswald, supra note 56, at 161 n.49.
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the administration should "take full account of the civil strife in El
Salvador" when reviewing petitions for EVD made by Salvadoran
nationals. 62 In April of 1983, eighty-nine members of Congress
signed a letter written to both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, again requesting that EVD status be granted to Salvadoran nationals. Another negative response led to a more extensive
"Sense of Congress" resolution. This time Congress plainly stated
that "the Secretary of State should recommend that extended voluntary departure status be granted to aliens ...who are nationals of El
Salvador .... [S]uch status should be granted to those aliens until
the situation in El Salvador has changed sufficiently to permit their
safely residing in that country. ' 6 A third "Sense of Congress" resolution was passed in 1983.4
None of these efforts moved the administration to act. Thus, frustrated with the administration's intransigence, Congress initiated
safe haven legislation for Salvadorans.
D.

The Congress

Safe haven legislation was first introduced by Senator Dennis De
Concini (D-Ariz.) and Representative John Joseph Moakley (DMass.) in 1983. While the legislation passed in the House of Representatives in various forms and on five occasions, the bill did not
reach the Senate floor until 1990 due to a threat of filibuster.65
The bill that finally passed was hammered out in conference committee as a part of the Immigration Act of 1990.66 This legislation
was a compromise with two parts, one that created a statutory basis
for providing safe haven, and another that specifically provided safe
haven for Salvadoran nationals.67 The Salvadoran TPS law did not
clearly tie the period of protection to the objective reality-country
conditions-in El Salvador.68
62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

The threat of filibuster occurred even though the Senate Judiciary Committee

approved the bill twice, once in 1988 and again in 1989. Robert Rubin, Ten Years After:
Vindicationfor Salvadorans and New Promisesfor Safe Haven and Refugee Protection,
68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 97, 98 (1991).
66. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); INA §
244A, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (1990). Section 244(A)(b) grants TPS specifically to

Salvadoran nationals.
67.

Interview with Jim McGovern, aide to Congressman Moakley, Washington,

D.C. (Dec. 10, 1990).
68.

Nor did the TPS bill that passed call for a General Accounting Office study of

While seeking.to institutionalize the humanitarian concern behind
the practice of granting EVD, Congress also wanted to reform the
practice.6 As discussed in Section IV below, by taking one of its first
available opportunities to sidestep the legislation, the Bush administration showed that Congress had failed in its original goal, primarily because the legislation was a compromise. An examination of the
provisions of both the generic and the specific TPS laws is nevertheless instructive for future efforts to restore rationality and process to
safe haven programs.
III.

THE

TPS

LAW

The separate provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 designating El Salvador as a country whose nationals are entitled to TPS is
of more limited scope than the generic TPS statute.70 For example,
the generic TPS statute creates a procedure for its automatic exten-

sion7 1 unless the Attorney General finds, during a required review,
that the conditions initially giving rise to the declared protected status have changed.72
The automatic extension is expressly excluded from the legislation
granting TPS to Salvadorans. 7 a As enacted, TPS for Salvadorans
was scheduled to last for eighteen months, from January 1, 1991,
until June 30, 1992.71 Rather than tying TPS for Salvadorans to objective country conditions, as in the generic statute, the period of
conditions in El Salvador so that a comparison could be made between the conditions
there and those in other countries whose nationals had been granted EVD, as earlier
drafts had. See H.R. 618, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1987); Mims, supra note 60, at
617; 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 626, 626 (1986).
69. "While the Executive Branch is to be commended for its efforts to protect
endangered aliens by granting them EVD, the Committee believes that the current safe
haven (i.e., EVD) program is seriously flawed and in urgent need of reform. Deficiencies
include [the fact that] [t]he conditions under which safe haven may be granted, extended
or terminated do not appear in any regulation." H.R_ 627, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1988). The purpose of the original TPS legislation was to "replace the practice known
as extended voluntary departure ... with a more formal and orderly mechanism for the
selection, processing and registration of such individuals." Id. at 4. Representative Mazzoli advocated adopting a statutory criterion to formalize "the utterly mysterious process
currently used to grant EVD." 133 CONG. REc. H6237 (July 14, 1987).
70. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 303, 104 Stat. 4978 (adding
INA § 244A(b)).
71. INA § 244A.
72. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302(b)(3)(C) (adding INA § 244A(b)(3)(C)). The
Attorney General is permitted to consult with "appropriate agencies of the Government"
(these "appropriate agencies" are not named in the statute) and to review the conditions
in the designated country. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302(b)(3)(A) (adding INA §
244A(b)(3)(A)).
73. Immigration Act of 1990 § 303(c)(2) excludes subsection (b)(3) of INA §
244A, among others, from applicability to Salvadorans designated by § 303. This subsection of § 244A covers the Attorney General's "periodic review, terminations and extension of [TPS] designations."
74. The Attorney General accordingly could not mandate termination of TPS for
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protection appears to have been created by legislative compromise
alone. Technically, therefore, no extension would have been available. Any period of additional TPS coverage for Salvadorans would
need to have been secured by the Attorney General's designation
under the generic statute or through other legislation.
If El Salvador had originally been designated for TPS under the
generic statute, protection would continue for as long as "conditions
for such designation under this subsection continue to be met. ' 75 The
generic TPS statute describes specific conditions, the continued presence of which should be considered in deciding whether to terminate
TPS. These conditions include "ongoing civil conflict . . . [that]

would pose a serious threat to [refugees'] personal safety," "environmental disaster," and most importantly, the foreign state's not being
able to "handle adequately
the return -to the state of aliens who are
' 76
nationals of the state.
It is undeniable that objective conditions in El Salvador have
changed since the passage of TPS legislation. On January 16, 1992,
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebel
force and the Salvadoran government signed a peace agreement
which was the culmination of more than one and a half years of
negotiations brokered by the United Nations. 77 The accords mandate
a transition to a peaceful, pluralistic society, but the transition will
be complicated and lengthy. One Salvadoran newspaper has separated the implementation of the peace accords into 117 finite tasks,
some of which are not even scheduled to begin until 1994.78 For example, the peace agreement calls for a cease-fire beginning on February 1, 1992, the demobilization of the FMLN at the end of
1992,7 and general elections including the FMLN as a legal political party in March of 1994.
Further, despite the signing of the peace accords, the continuing
Salvadorans prior to the date established by Congress. Immigration Act of 1990 §
303(a)(2).
75. INA § 244A(b)(3).
76. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302(b)(1)(A) and (B)(i),(ii) (adding INA §
244A(b)(1)(A), (B)(i),(ii)). Ironically, the Federal Register announcement by Commissioner Gene McNary of the INS cites the rationale for the DED program as El Salvador's inability to currently accommodate the repatriation of Salvadorans granted TPS. 57
Fed. Reg. 28,701 (1992). See infra discussion accompanying notes 101-06.
77. Marjorie Miller, Salvador Embarking on Peace, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1992, at
A4; Richard Boudreaux, Civil War Ends in El Salvador with Signing of Treaty, N.Y.
TIIEs, Jan. 17, 1992, at Al.
78. EL MUNDO, Feb. 1, 1992, at 22-23.
79. Id.

human rights violations8" indicate that the transition to peace, other
than on paper, will be an arduous process. Given the fragility of the
peace and the economic disarray caused by more than a decade of
civil war, all political sectors in El Salvador have agreed that the
country is not ready to receive a mass repatriation of refugees from
the United States."1
If El Salvador were covered under the generic statute, current
country conditions could be taken into account. The last reference in
the statute, in particular, to the inability of a country to handle the
return of refugees, would support continued protection for
Salvadorans.
Further, under the generic statute, the Attorney General is permitted to designate a country if the "foreign state officially has requested designation," or
if the Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary and temporary
conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens ...

from returning to the

state in safety, unless the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens
to remain temporarily in 82
the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.

El Salvador did officially request designation and publicly requested
more time before a mass repatriation of refugees.8 3
The renewal in January 1992 of TPS status for nationals of Lebanon"4 also supports the correctness of continued TPS status for
Salvadorans. The notice extending TPS for Lebanese states:
I [Attorney General Barr] find that there still exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in Lebanon that prevent aliens who are nationals of Lebanon, and aliens having no nationality who last habitually resided in
80.

See, e.g., INTERFAITH TASKFORCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA. LEGISLATIVE ALERT

(Apr. 1992). This report compiles a troubling list of death squad activities and human
rights abuses that have occurred since the signing of the peace accord.
81. In a press release dated November 21, 1991, the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) announced its support for an extension of TPS. In late February 1992, President Cristiani visited President Bush and members of Congress for the
express purpose of requesting an extension of TPS. Cristiani Viaja a Washington Para
Reunirse con el Presidente Bush, LA OPINION, Feb. 24, 1992, at 3a.

82. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302(b)(1)(B)(iii), (C) (adding INA §
244A(b)(1)(B)(iii) and (C)).
83. On February 10, 1992, the Salvadoran government officially requested an extension of TPS from the United States government. Reported on Salvadoran television
broadcast (TV 12, Feb. 12, 1992). Thereafter, President Cristiani traveled to Washington and met with President Bush to request an extension. Reported on Salvadoran television broadcast (TV 12, Feb. 24, 1992). Salvadoran Vice-President Merino traveled to
Washington to request extension of TPS. Reported on Salvadoran television broadcast
(TV 12, Mar. 31, 1992) (monitored by El Rescate's Human Rights Department).
84. 57 Fed. Reg. 2931 (1992). TPS for Lebanese nationals was extended from
March 28, 1992 until March 28, 1993. The Federal Register notice contains an estimation by Attorney General Barr that no more than 7,500 Lebanese nationals (or aliens
having no nationality who last habitually resided in Lebanon) currently were eligible for
TPS. The same day, TPS protection was also extended for Liberian nationals (and aliens
having no nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia), of whom Barr estimated
that there were no more than 5,000 eligible for TPS. Id. at 2932.
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Lebanon, from returning to Lebanon in safety, as a result of the continued
armed conflict in that nation.85

According to the Bush administration's reports, the human rights situation in Lebanon improved significantly in 1991.16 While violations
of human rights continued, the State Department concluded that
"overall, 1991 witnessed fewer incidents of violence and greater expansion of Lebanese central government authority over Lebanese
territory than at any time since the onset of civil disturbances in
1975.1' 8 7 At the time of extension of Lebanese TPS, in Lebanon, as
in El Salvador, tentative peace agreements had been reached. Continuation of TPS for Lebanese nationals in light of the signing of
peace accords serves only to demonstrate the administration's inconsistency in refusing to extend TPS for Salvadorans because of an
accord between the government and the FMLN. 8
While the signing of the Salvadoran peace accord is significant, all
sending factors-the objective country conditions-apparently must
be considered under the statute before termination is appropriate.
But, given the Attorney General's broad discretion under the TPS
statute, the practical value of the standard for termination is
questionable.
IV. THE DED PROGRAM
The campaign for a renewal of TPS for Salvadorans faced a number of complexities. First, Congress granted TPS for Salvadorans
through a special act when it created a generic TPS statute. That
special act did not provide a mechanism for the extension of the designation. Accordingly, only another act of Congress or a decision by
the Attorney General to designate El Salvador under the TPS statute could extend the period of TPS for Salvadorans. Second, from
the time of the grant of TPS to Salvadorans until its mandated expiration, major, if yet tentative, changes occurred in El Salvador. A
peace accord was signed and a cease-fire was put into effect. Third,
Congress provided little statutory guidance as to when, and under
85. Id. at 2931. This cursory statement is indicative of the administration's ability
to quickly review and designate nationals for TPS when it is of interest to do so.
86. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1991. at 1485-86 (1992).
87. Id. at 1485.
88. On Feb. 8, 1993, acting Attorney General Stuart Gerson terminated TPS status for Lebanese nationals, citing the improved security situation. 58 Fed. Reg. 7582
(1993). This was four years after the signing of the Taif Agreement, which ended the
prolonged period of civil disturbance in Lebanon.

what conditions, safe haven status should be terminated.

In a letter dated May 4, 1992, President Bush informed Salvadoran President Alfredo Cristiani:
Although we will not be able to extend Temporary Protected Status [for
Salvadorans], I am happy to tell you that Attorney General Barr will be
taking the necessary steps to grant Deferred Enforced Departure for Salvadoran citizens for one year beyond the expiration of their Temporary Protected Status. This will provide Salvadoran citizens the same rights to
remain and work in the United States. We will carefully consider an extension next year. Let me add that when repatriations begin sometime in the
future, the return of your countrymen will inevitably occur over a prolonged
period.89

Any opportunity for the Attorney General to designate El Salvador
under generic TPS legislation or for Congress to specially redesignate El Salvador for TPS status, as it previously did,90 was accordingly preempted by the Bush administration's announcement of a
grant of DED to Salvadorans.
The DED program was presented as an order from President Bush
to the INS to decline to enforce the deportation of Salvadorans registered for TPS until June 30, 1993. 1 The Bush administration did
not explain publicly why it chose to employ DED rather than to extend TPS.

Nearly two hundred thousand Salvadorans in the United States
under the benefit of TPS were affected by the DED action. 2 INS
headquarters sent instructions regarding DED procedures to their
field offices on May 15, 1992.11 Among other requirements, registration for DED was limited to Salvadoran nationals who registered for
both the first and second periods of TPS or who could "establish that
the failure to reregister was for good cause."94
89. Letter from President Bush to President Cristiani (May 4, 1992).
90. Passing such a hurdle may not be easy, especially given the tone Congress set
in the Immigration Act of 1990. If Congress chooses to amend the TPS law to change
the designation of a TPS beneficiary to permanent legal status or to pass a bill or resolution effecting related procedures, it must do so with a three-fifths majority in the Senate.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980 § 244A(h)(1) and (2).
91. 57 Fed. Reg. 28701 (1992).
92. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600 (1992).
93. Significantly, the INS has agreed to consider DED as an extension of TPS for
purposes of the American Baptist Churches settlement. See supra note 44. Refugee advocates were concerned that DED would have a "disorienting" impact on Salvadorans'
rights under American Baptist Churches because the settlement agreement ties those
rights to the end of TPS for Salvadorans. See 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600 (1992).
94. INS Wire, June 24, 1992, at I. The reregistration requirement has generated
substantial concern among refugee rights advocates, as failure to reregister has been acknowledged to be largely the fault of the INS. For instance, the INS failed to provide
adequate notice to TPS registrants of their responsibility to reregister, in violation of the
INS's own regulations. In many areas, Salvadorans were unable to reregister for TPS
due to the inability of local offices to process reregistrations in a timely manner. Finally,
slowness by the INS in processing work authorization applications discouraged many
from reregistering, as the work authorization a person would have received would already
have expired by the time it was received, or because the work authorization the person
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Statements by Bush administration officials indicated that they
considered the DED program for Salvadorans to be practically an
extension of the previously terminated TPS period. These statements
further indicated that safe haven for Salvadorans was never considered by the Bush administration to be mandated by international
law. According to a senior INS official, TPS and DED are essentially similar: "Either way,
[the Salvadorans] can stay in the country
'95
temporarily and work."

V.

EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND SAFE HAVEN PROGRAMS AFTER
THE PASSAGE OF THE

TPS

STATUTE

The passage of the TPS statute and the Bush administration's refusal to apply it to Salvadorans raise two issues of executive discretion: first, does the TPS statute limit the plenary power of the
executive branch over matters of immigration and refugee law; and
second, does the TPS statute allow, explicitly or implicitly, review of
the Attorney General's decisions to grant or deny TPS? These questions are germane to a discussion of TPS in the context of contemporary international law in that limitations contained in the statute, or
to be extrapolated through interpretation of the statute, may adversely affect the ability of the United States to integrate principles
of international law into its refugee policy.
A.

Limitation of PresidentialPower96

The DED program was implemented through a directive of the
President rather than by legislation or designation by the Attorney
General. The issuance of an executive order regarding a safe haven
program raises questions about the permissible extent of presidential
discretion, given the existence of legislation that (i) speaks directly
to the issue the President is attempting to regulate, and (ii) provides
that the program it initiates is the exclusive means of granting safe
haven status.
DED is not a new program, nor does it represent the first time the
was holding was already valid through the end of the TPS period.

SALVADORAN

BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION, REFUGEE & CITIZENSHIP FORUM
1992) [hereinafter SALVADORAN TPS BULLETIN].
95. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600 (1992).

TPS

(July 3,

96. The issue of shared power between the executive branch and Congress in immigration matters has been extensively debated without a clear resolution. See, e.g.,
THOMAS

(1985).

A.

ALEINIKOFF

& DAVID A.

MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY

1-39

executive branch has ignored legislative attempts to proscribe refugee policy. President Bush created a similar program to offer ongoing safe haven to Chinese nationals in the United States at the time
of the Tiananmen Square massacre. 97 At the same time that Bush
vetoed legislation permitting Chinese students to waive foreign residency requirements under the terms of their non-immigrant visas, he
directed the INS to take measures that would provide the same benefits as contained in the proposed legislation.
The Chinese DED program was initiated by Bush's announcement
that the United States government would give "sympathetic review"
to requests by students from the People's Republic of China for extensions of stay. 98 On June 6, 1989, Attorney General Thornburgh
directed INS Commissioner Alan C. Nelson to defer the enforced
departure of the Chinese students.99 President Bush's veto on November 30, 1989 of H.R. 2712, the "Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989," was outlined in a "Memorandum of
Disapproval" wherein the President set out with more detail the
delayed departure program offered to the Chinese students.' 00
The Chinese program was enacted prior to the passage of TPS
legislation in November 1990. While the Bush administration's reservation to itself of the power to grant safe haven status by vetoing
legislation that had the same effect may have been questionable, its
conduct in creating a Salvadoran DED program when a statute exists indicated a stubborn insistence on treating safe haven matters as
solely within executive discretion.
Like the Chinese program, the Salvadoran DED program was announced by President Bush. President Cristiani's release of the letter
to the Salvadoran press took the Bush administration, particularly
the INS, by surprise.' In the Federal Register notice published on
June 26, 1992, the DED program was stated as a directive to the
INS.' 0 ' Although not'stated as an executive order, the publication of
this directive in the Federal Register gave it the same effect as an

97. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 600 (1992). The order prevented the INS from
deporting People's Republic of China nationals (primarily students) and their dependents
who were in the United States between June 5, 1989, the date the Tiananmen Square
massacre began, and the date the order was signed and whose nonimmigrant visas expired before June 6, 1990.
98. James Gerstenzang, Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression, L.A.
TIMEs, June 6, 1989, at AI5.
99. Official correspondence from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to INS
Commissioner Alan C. Nelson, dated June 6, 1989. This directive of the Attorney General was implemented with INS Cable CO 243.69-P (June 7, 1989).
100. Presidential Memorandum of Disapproval, 25 WEEKLY COaIP. PRES, Doc.
1853 (Nov. 30, 1989).
TPS

101.

SALVADORAN

102.

57 Fed. Reg. 28,701 (1992).

BULLETIN,

supra note 94.
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103
executive order.

The Federal Register notice stated the reason for the implementa-

tion of the program to be El Salvador's inability to "accommodate

the repatriation of approximately 150,000 people granted TPS."' 10 4

The generic TPS statute, however, recognizes this factor as allowing
a designation by the Attorney General.

05

Rather than issuing an

executive order, President Bush's correct course would have been to
instruct the Attorney General to designate Salvadorans for TPS. The
Attorney General himself would not have had the discretion to ignore the statute and grant DED to Salvadorans. The TPS statute
provides that TPS is the "exclusive authority" (i.e., the sole remedy)

of the Attorney General to permit persons to remain in the United
States temporarily because of their particular nationality.

06

No

principle of constitutional law would seem to permit the President to
order the Attorney General to do something that the Attorney Gen--

eral could not do himself.
B.

Limitation of the Attorney General's Power

The statute's provision for exclusivity of remedy and traditional
constitutional jurisprudence establishes the limit of executive discre-

tion to create additional safe haven programs. The statute on its
face, however, gives the Attorney General virtually unlimited discre-

tion in the administration of the TPS statute by providing that
"there is no judicial review of any determination of the Attorney

General with respect to the designation, or termination or extension
of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection.' 0 7
103. Directives by the Bush administration to ignore provisions of statutes have
been thoroughly criticized on the ground that such directives are a refusal by the executive branch to uphold its obligation contained in Article III, section 3, clause 3 of the
United States Constitution, to "take care.that the Laws be faithfully executed." See, e.g.,
Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President,64 N.C. L. REV. 381-84 (1986) (criticizing
Director of Office of Management and Budget David Stockman's directive to all heads of
executive departments and agencies to disregard certain provisions of the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogativeover Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 627, 690 ("A literal reading of the
Take Care Clause confirms that it is the President's duty to ensure that officials obey
Congress' instructions; the Clause does not create a presidential power so great that it
can be used to frustrate a statutory intention.").
104. 57 Fed. Reg. 28,701 (1992).
105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
106. INA § 244A(g). The statute also provides that the program implemented
with respect to Chinese nationals will not be affected by this provision.
107. Immigration Act of 1990 § 302(a) (adding INA § 244(b)(5)(A)). The Act
also provides that the Attorney General may designate any foreign state for TPS only if

691

The INS has traditionally enjoyed broad discretion in matters of
immigration and naturalization. 108 Even with the explicit bar to review contained in the statute, however, the Attorney General's discretion may be tempered by the reluctance of some courts to give the

executive branch or an administrative agency unencumbered discretion. Even when a statute appears on its face to block judicial recourse, as does the TPS statute, courts have not only considered the
language of the statute, but they have also considered the statutory

history, common sense, policy, and concern for the risk that the absence of judicial review may extend an invitation to exceed conferred
powers and disregard statutory requirements.'0 9 Courts have attempted to guard constitutional rights in spite of a permeable shield
blocking judicial review."'
Judicial review has proceeded in spite of an explicit bar on review,
when constitutional claims arise through the apparent usurpation of
delegated legislative power."' An explicit bar to judicial review has
been limited to bar review of only factual determinations, "while
permitting review to determine whether there ha[s] been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of
governing legislation, or some like error going to the heart of the
administrative determination."" 2
Even simple factual determinations are subject to judicial review
in spite of a clear and convincing intent to bar judicial review when
an administrative decision is an error of fact. In this case the error
constitutes a mistake of law and would be subject to judicial
review. 113
the Attorney General finds that certain conditions are present. Id. § 244A(b)(l). The use
of the word "may" indicates that the Attorney General is able to designate a country
when the requisite conditions exist, but is not required to do so.
108. As was set out clearly in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), "'the power to
expel or exclude aliens [has long been recognized] as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial controls.'" Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
109. See, e.g., Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
110. In Ralpho this meant that the statute in question was to be read in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964)).
111. Owens v. Hills, 450 F. Supp. 218, 221 (N.D. Iii. 1978). The statute at issue
provided:
The Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the terms and conditions under
which expenditures and payments may be made under the provisions of this
section, and his decisions regarding such expenditures or payments, and the
terms and conditions under which the same are approved or disapproved, shall
be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to judicial review.
Nevertheless, the district court held that the mandate of judicial review was required to
prevent the unlawful delegation of legislative power.
112. Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 766, 780 (1985) (citing
Scroggins v. United States, 397 F.2d 295, 297 (1968)).
113. Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 624 (1977).
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The Attorney General's decision to grant TPS, under the generic
statute, is to be made by consulting information from other sources,
including the State Department. Although the statute provides the
Attorney General with extreme latitude in the interpretation of the
facts gathered and advice rendered, a rational interpretation of any
given set of facts must have limits.
A brief review of the history of TPS in its prior form, EVD, shows
that the safe haven provision has been the exclusive domain of the
executive branch. Accordingly, safe haven has been consistently used
for political purposes, in spite of the apolitical mandate contained in
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980. The codification of
this humanitarian measure in TPS ensures that there is a standard
by which to monitor the actions of the Attorney General in its implementation. The power of the Attorney General to grant or
deny
1 14
EVD turned on the broad discretion delegated by Congress.
This broad discretion and the absence of a voice from Congress
were the underlying reasons for the courts' past refusal to review the
Attorney General's continuing neglect of the plight of the
Salvadorans fleeing to this country.115 The passage of the specific
TPS legislation for Salvadorans and the general TPS legislation for
other designated nationalities addressed the plight of Salvadorans
and other nationals who legally fall short of qualifying for asylum,
and thereby acted to displace some of the broad executive discretion
of the executive branch. As the TPS program makes the executive
branch the protagonist, however, there must be guarantees of due
process in the implementation of the program. A TPS program devoid of due process guarantees and judicial review would be little
improvement over the absence of a TPS statute. If the statute is
taken on its face, without an understanding of the congressional intent in its enactment and of the history of the movement finally leading to the promulgation of TPS, then the executive branch is allowed
once again complete discretion in the enactment of the program and
again the grant of, or refusal to grant, protective status will be subject to the whims of the executive branch and its foreign policy priorities. Decisions made in regard to the TPS program must therefore
114. INA § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a): "The Attorney General shall be charged
with the administration and enforcement of this Act and all other laws relating to the
immigration and naturalization of aliens .... "
115. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney General, 804
F.2d 1256, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "Where Congress has not seen fit to limit the
agency's discretion to suspend enforcement of a statute as to particular groups of aliens,
we cannot review facially legitimate exercises of that discretion." Id.

be carried out in an evenhanded manner. 116 In making its decisions,
an administrative agency must rely on those factors put forward for
consideration by Congress; it must consider the important aspects on
which each decision depends and must offer an explanation for each
decision, especially those decisions running counter to the evidence
before the agency. 1
VI. THE EXTENSION OF TPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The generic TPS statute and the TPS legislation for Salvadorans
reflect a sense on the part of the United States that an obligation
exists to recognize "non-Convention" refugees. Considering that the
United States has repeatedly criticized other countries for failing to
live up to their international legal responsibility when they have
turned away, ll " forcibly repatriated, or deported those persons fleeing civil war or famine,'1 the refusal to grant Salvadorans a continued period of TPS, in accord with country conditions, was
disingenuous and inconsistent with the most modern norms of international law.
The avoidance of forced repatriation of those unwilling to return
to their homeland is a basic tenet of international refugee law.1 20
Whether affecting a Convention or a non-Convention refugee, the
act of forced repatriation can be considered a serious breach of a
state's international legal obligations.' 2' Most international and regional instruments are written in terms of the "voluntary repatriation" of refugees. Thus, the international community considers the
termination of protection or invocation of a cessation clause an extremely serious act. 22
For example, the Organization of African Unity Convention
(OAU Convention) 2 3 contains elaborate provisions for voluntary repatriation. Its focus is not on a specific set of factors that may result
116. "[T]he District Director [of the INS] cannot, consistent with the character
and obligation of administering justice impartially, decide in contrary ways two cases
which are identical in every essential respect." Del Mundo v. Rosenberg, 341 F. Supp.
345, 348 (C.D. Ca. 1972).
117. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795,
812-14 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
118. This has been particularly true of United States criticisms of the treatment
received by the Vietnamese Boat People. See, e.g., Robert P. Vecchi, Don't Let the Boat
People Drown, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1988, at A19.
119. See generally Robert F. Gorman, U.S. Refugee Policy in Africa, in REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 115 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989).
120.

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

303 (1966).
121. Id.
122. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
Inter-Office Memorandum No. 90 (May 2, 1990).
123. See supra note 22.
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in termination of protected status, but rather on establishing conditions that will eventually facilitate the voluntary repatriation of the
refugees. The OAU Convention mandates that countries of origin
and countries of refuge work together to promote and expedite the
creation of conditions that will make voluntary repatriation possible.1 24 Other regional instruments have followed this integrated ap25

proach to termination of protected status.
On the international level, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees establishes legal norms for cessation of
status as a Convention refugee, as does the UNHCR Handbook 26
and the UNHCR statute.1 27 The cessation clauses found in these
documents are derived from the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, which defines the conditions under
which "refugees" and "displaced persons" will become or will cease
to become the concern of the organization, and these clauses remain
relevant to both Convention and non-Convention refugees. 2
Article 1(C)(5) of the Convention provides that cessation applies
to a refugee who, among other reasons, "can no longer, because the
circumstances in connection with which he has become a refugee
have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality."
The drafters of the Convention envisaged that before the cessation
clause could be invoked, at least three conditions must exist. First,
the change in the refugees' home country must be politically significant; that is, there must be a significant democratic reform of all
elements of the state apparatus, including free and democratic elections, a government committed to human rights, and an independent
judiciary able to provide a fair and open trial to accused persons and
124. See, e.g., M.R. Rwelamira, Two Decades of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
557 (1989).
125. The International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, Geneva, June 1314, 1989, Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action, states every effort will be
made to create the conditions for voluntary repatriation. U.N. Doc. A/CON F. 148 (Apr.
26, 1989). This idea is echoed in International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), Guatemala City, May 29-31, 1989, Declarationand Concerted Plan
of Action, U.N. Doc. A/44/527 (1989).
126. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979).
127. See supra note 17.
128. UNHCR GENERAL LEGAL ADVICE UNIT-DIVISION OF REFUGEE LAW AND
DOCTRINE. NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1(C)(5). (6) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND OF PARAGRAPH 6(A)(E). (F) OF THE STATUTE OF THE OFFICE OF UNHCR
3 (March 1990).

to prosecute human rights abuses effectively. Second, the change
must be truly effective: rhetorical commitments are insufficient. Further, it should not be assumed that effective change can take place in
a short period of time, especially after years of abuse. Cessation cannot be invoked simply because of progress that is being made, even
observable progress. Finally, the change must be durable and shown
to be so.129 Adopting the international legal standard, a number of

states have amended their domestic legislation to allow non-Convention refugees to remain in the country of refuge until it is possible
for them to return to their home country in dignity and without
danger. 130
The domestic legislation of other states, while not explicitly providing for non-Convention refugees, also focuses on the termination
of the sending factors for the refugee flow. For instance, Canada's
refugee legislation provides that "[a] person ceases to be a Convention refugee when the reasons for the person's fear of persecution in
the country that the person left, or outside of which the person remained, cease to exist."' 3'
The TPS statute demonstrates that Congress is cognizant of these
principles. The language of the TPS statute is parallel to that used
in the OAU Convention and in the Cartagena Declaration.' 32 It is
noteworthy that the generic TPS statute also focuses on the end of
the objective factors that necessitated the protection, in that it mandates protection until conditions for the designation are no longer
33
met.1
Certain patterns can be discerned in the application of the cessation clause to individual states following the end of an armed conflict
or extensive civil unrest. On only eight occasions has the cessation of
refugee protection been invoked in this context. Guinea-Bissau successfully declared its independence from Portugal on September 24,
1973. In April 1974, independent status was officially recognized by
Portugal. By September 1975, the UNHCR considered that conditions had sufficiently changed to invoke the cessation clause.' 4 Angola's independence, on the other hand, was also recognized by
Portugal in 1974, but not until June 1979 did the UNHCR deem
129.
also

JAMES C. HATHAWAY. THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS

JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE/CANADA.

INCREASED

199-205 (1991). See

FAITH? REPATRIATIONS

PORTATIONS TO EL SALVADOR, A HUMAN RIGHTS STUDY (1991)

AND

Du-

(discussing the cessa-

tion clause as applied to El Salvador).
130. Report on 35th Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doe. A/AC.96/651 (1984).
131. Immigration Act, 1976-1977, R.S.C., ch. 1-2 (1985), amended by 1988 S.C.
905, ch. 35 § 2(2)(e) (Can.).
132. All three protect war refugees and victims of civil unrest and natural disaster.
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
134. See UNHCR IOM/38/75 - BOM/48/75 (Dec. 1, 1975).
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conditions sufficiently changed to merit application of the cessation
clause. 135 Conditions changed rapidly enough in Zimbabwe that the
UNHCR applied the cessation clause a little less than a year following the permanent end of hostilities. 136
One of the few examples from the Americas is Argentina. President Raul Alfonsin was elected in 1983, bringing an official end to
seven years of repressive military rule. The restoration of constitutional rule was considered to be solid enough by 1985 that the
UNHCR applied the cessation clause to Argentine refugees. 3 7
The process of change of circumstances may be "subtle and reflected over a number of years by legal reforms and gradual improvements in human rights,"' 3 8 and so no arbitrary period of time
should be used to determine when the cessation clause should be applied. In fact, the Director of UNHCR's Division of Refugee Law
and Doctrine has stated that "it is noteworthy that neither the end of
some wars nor some political developments have yet been considered
sufficient to warrant the application of the cessation clause to hundreds of thousands of refugees."' 13 9
Cessation determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis;
they must evaluate relevant country conditions, such as the implementation of the terms of a peace accord and the rate of reconstruction. 4 ' As a rule of thumb, the UNHCR advocates that individual
states allow refugees to remain in the country of refuge for two years
after an armed conflict or civil war ends.' While host countries are
usually suffering from "compassion fatigue" by the time the armed
conflict ends in the sending country, the High Commissioner for Refugees has asked host countries to have sufficient patience to allow
adequate reconstruction to occur to make repatriation a viable, durable solution.' 42
135. See UNHCR IOM/22/79 - BOM/20/79 (June 15, 1979).
136. See UNHCR IOM/4/81 - BOM/4/81 (Jan. 14, 1981).
137. See UNHCR IOM/84/84 -FOM/79/84 (Nov. 13, 1985).
138. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL. THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1985).
139. UNHCR IOM/90 at 6 (May 2, 1990).
140. Application of these principles has not always been smooth, but problems usually can be traced to the failure to create a durable solution. The most frequent problem
encountered in repatriations has been inadequate reconstruction. See generally U.S.
COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES. WHEN REFUGEES WON'T Go HOME: THE DILEMMA
CHADIANS IN SUDAN (1987).

OF

141. Telephone interview with Fernando Chang-Muy, Senior Legal Advisor,
UNHCR, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 10, 1991).
142. Dr. Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, Refugees: Challenges of Humanitarianism in
the 1990's, Address Sponsored by the Asia Society (April 3, 1992) (transcript on file
with the San Diego Law Review).

Lessons from other forced mass migrations teach the importance
of truly durable solutions that coordinate with reconstruction efforts
to ensure refugees' ability to return safely and with dignity to their
homeland. 143 While the success of mass repatriations has been greatest when dislocation has been shortest, the conditions the refugees
find upon return are of great importance to repatriation. 4
Many Salvadoran refugees have been in the United States for several years. The length of their dislocation, combined with the difference in economic standards and the present lack of economic
opportunities in El Salvador, will mean that the success of repatriation, both for individual refugees and for El Salvador as a country,
will be uncertain until all the root causes of the refugee flow have
been eliminated. Lasting and successful repatriation of Salvadorans
will accordingly be tied to both full implementation of the peace accords and El Salvador's reconstruction efforts.
The period of TPS for Salvadorans should depend upon the rate of
transition and reconstruction in El Salvador. In determining this period, a comparison must be made between the conditions in El Salvador and those in other countries to which refugees have been safely
repatriated. For example, if the implementation of the peace accords
progresses smoothly, and reconstruction efforts are successful, the
protection period could be similar to that of Zimbabwe: approximately
one year following the permanent end of the armed conflict.' 45 If difficulties in implementation of the accords and
reconstruction occur, the period of protection could be similar to that
of Angola: more than four years following the permanent end of the
armed conflict. The decision to end safe haven must not be made
arbitrarily.
CONCLUSION

The TPS statute was a weak attempt by Congress to set limits on
executive discretion in refugee matters by imposing some minimum

standard of compatibility with developing international law. Normally, decisions to grant or deny safe haven status should be made in
accordance with the law based on objective factors related to country

conditions.
To end the TPS program for Salvadorans in June of 1992, before
the peace accords came to fruition and before the mandated changes
143. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 119, at 115.
144. Id.
145. The final cessation of hostilities in El Salvador was marked by the demobilization of the FMLN on Dec. 15, 1992. This date had been postponed from October
because of delays in the implementation of the peace accords. As of March 15, 1993, the
FMLN has refused to destroy its remaining surface-to-air missiles, citing governmental
noncompliance with the peace accords.
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in country conditions occurred, was premature. The Bush administration's method- of continuing a kind of safe haven status for
Salvadorans, by executive order, shows that Congress did not achieve
its goal of creating a clear depoliticized standard for safe haven designations with the passage of the TPS laws. President Bush's announcement of DED for Salvadorans indicates that safe haven
remains a matter of politics and not of international law.
President Clinton's campaign promise to reverse the Bush administration's interdiction policy for Haitian refugees was a hopeful signal that the new administration would respect international law and
humanitarian principles in granting safe haven to persons fleeing
conditions of civil strife. Clinton's failure to keep his campaign
promise and his decision to maintain the present policy for at least
the first six months of his administration demonstrate the need to
take the issue of safe haven status out of political hands.
The decision whether to extend the DED program, or a new designation of TPS for Salvadorans, will be made by the Clinton administration in the next several months. This Article has argued that
conditions in El Salvador have not changed sufficiently to warrant a
forced return. Regardless of the Clinton administration's decision,
however, the United States government's treatment of the issue of
safe haven has highlighted the weaknesses of the TPS statute. Congress should revise the statute by reducing the absolute discretion of
the Attorney General, to end once and for all the predominance of
short-run political expediency over sound refugee law and policy
grounded in contemporary international standards.

